The State of Utah v. Rickey Lee Jackson : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2001
The State of Utah v. Rickey Lee Jackson : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Vernon B Romney; Attorney General; Attorneys for Respondent.
Robert M McRae; Hatch, McRae and Richardson; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, The State of Utah v. Rickey Lee Jackson, No. 13661.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/847
# RECEIVED 
LAW LIBRARY] 
IN THE SUPREME COtfRT1975 
OF THE STATE OF^i]^^ 
. Reuben Clark Law School 
T H E STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
In the Interest of: 
RICKEY LEE JACKSON, a minor, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
13661 
Brief of Defendant-Appellant 
Appeal from a Judgment of Guilty in the District Juvenile 
Court far Tooele County, State of Utah 
Before Honorable Regnal Garff, Jr., Judge, 
Sitting in Salt Lake County 
Vernon B. Romney 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Respondent 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Robert M. McRae 
HATCH, McRAE & RICHARDSON 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
370 East Fifth South Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
F I L E D 
JUN 1 81974 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF T H E 
NATURE OF THE CASE 1 
DISPOSITION IN T H E LOWER COURT .... 2 
R E L I E F SOUGHT ON APPEAL 3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3 
ARGUMENT: 
POINT I : SELF-DEFENSE AND JUS-
TIFICATION FOR DEFENDANT'S CON-
DUCT AS A MATTER OF LAW WAS 
ESTABLISHED DURING T H E TRIAL 5 
POINT I I : REASONABLE DOUBT WAS 
ESTABLISHED AS A MATTER OF FACT.. 16 
POINT I I I : THE LANGUAGE IN SEC-
TION 76-5-103, UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED 1953 AS AMENDED, IS AMBIGU-
UOUS AND AS SUCH DOES NOT DE-
F I N E THE COMMISSION OF A PUBLIC 
OFFENSE. TO CHARGE T H E DEFEND-
ANT W I T H T H E COMMISSION OF AN 
OFFENSE WHICH IS NOT D E F I N E D IS 
CLEARLY VIOLATIVE OF ESTAB-
LISHED LAW 19-20 
CONCLUSION 20 
i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CASES CITED Page 
State vs. Coyle, 41 Utah 320, 126 P . 305 16, 17 
State vs. Harris, 58 Utah 331, 199 P . 145 18 
State vs. Law, 106 Utah 196, 
147 P.2d 324 [1944] 13 
State vs. Talarico, 57 Utah 229, 193 P . 860 17 
State vs. Terrell, 55 Utah 314,186 P.108 [1919] 11 
State vs. Turner, 95 Utah 129, 
79 P.2d 46 [1938] 11, 12, 15 
State vs. Vincent Joseph Archuletta, 
Case No. 13579 20 
S T A T U T E S C I T E D 
26-401 (f), Georgia Code Annotated 10 
55-10-112, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 2 
76-2-402, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 5 
76-2-402(2) (c), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 14 
76-5-103, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 19 
76-30-10(3), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 6 
77-31-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 16 
ii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
T H E STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
x • I T J_ J_ p [ v^ase IN o» 
In the Interest of: > 
( 13661 
R I C K E Y L E E JACKSON, a minor, 
Defendant-A ppellant. 
Brief of Defendant-Appellant 
S T A T E M E N T O F 
T H E N A T U R E O F T H E CASE 
The State of Utah filed a delinquency petition in 
the Second District Juvenile Court charging that (1) 
on or about August 21, 1973, at Highway 37, State 
of Utah, approximately one mile north of Tooele City 
limits, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 203 
(1) (b), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended 1973, 
said child intending to cause serious bodily injury com-
mitted an act clearly dangerous to human life, to-wit: 
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he shot Tito Alfonso Suazo which caused the death of 
Tito Alfonso Suazo; (2) on or about August 21, 
1973, at Tooele County, State of Utah, in violation 
of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 103(1) (b), Utah Code 
Annotated 1953 as amended 1973, said child did in-
tentionally or knowingly cause bodily injury to Paul 
Mondragon by use of a deadly weapon, and (3) on or 
about August 21, 1973, at Tooele County, State of 
Utah, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 103 
(1) (b), Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended 
1973, said child did intentionally or knowingly cause 
bodily injury to Elmer Gonzales by use of a deadly 
weapon. 
In a trial without a jury, before Judge Regnal 
Garff, defendant was not found guilty of second degree 
murder, but was found guilty of manslaughter [R-310] 
in regard to allegation #1, and was found guilty as 
charged of counts 2 and 3. Defendant now appeals 
the decree of the juvenile court pursuant to Section 
55-10-112, Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended, 
which states in part: 
"55-10-112. Appeal to Supreme Court from 
order, decree or judgment of juvenile court— 
Procedure.—An appeal to the Supreme Court 
may be taken from any order, decree, or judg-
ment of the juvenile court." 
D I S P O S I T I O N I N T H E L O W E R COURT 
On October 30, 1973, Honorable Regnal Garff, 
Jr., found defendant guilty of one count of man-
2 
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slaughter (what would have been voluntary man-
slaughter under the old Code) and two counts of ag-
gravated assault (formerly assault with a deadly 
weapon). Disposition of the case was set for December 
5, 1973, at which time defendant was ordered com-
mitted to the State Industrial School. 
Following Notice of Appeal, the Court granted a 
Petition for a Certificate of Probable Cause and re-
leased defendant without bail to his guardian, pending 
the outcome of this appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendant, Rickey Lee Jackson, pursuant to 
Section 55-10-112 Utah Code Annotated 1953 as 
amended, seeks a reversal of the decision of the juv-
enile court finding him guilty of manslaughter and two 
counts of aggravated assault. 
S T A T E M E N T OF F A C T S 
On August 21, 1973, appellant and three com-
panions, Jerry Caldwell, Kenny Martinez and Steven 
Spafford, were driving north on main street from 
Tooele to the Motor-Vu Drive-in near Stansbury Park 
[R. 197, 235]. As the appellant's automobile passed 
the Dairy Queen, one of the boys in the appellant's car 
called out to a friend [R-197, 235]. Another car, con-
taining the deceased, Tito Alfonso Suazo, and his 
3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
friends, was behind appellant's car and for unknown 
reasons began to tailgate appellant's car as it continued 
down Highway 36 [R-198, 243]. The Suazo car also 
contained E a r l Mondragen, Elmer Gonzales and P a u l 
Mondragen [R-114] . Suazo was 23 and weighed ap-
proximately forty pounds more than appellant [R-230, 
275]. The decedent's car tried many times to pass ap-
pellant's car but the oncoming traffic wouldn't permit 
it [R-205] . Eventually as these cars were proceeding 
north at about fifty miles per hour, Suazo passed ap-
pellant's car [R-198] and immediately slowed down, 
causing a small collission [R-214, 258]. Finally, the 
Suazo car skidded to a stop [R-103] causing another 
collision which damaged the front of the appellant's 
automobile [R-199]. 
As the appellant was t rying unsuccessfully to 
start his car [R-244], Suazo and his friends, who had 
been drinking, [R-85, 252, 130, 161], lighted from their 
car and came towards the appellant's automobile [R-
117, 209, 245]. Suazo grabbed appellant [R-210, 203] 
by the neck [R-244, 268] through his open car window 
and appellant, having a .22 pistol in his glove compart-
ment from rabbit hunting the day before [R-266] fired 
one shot [R-244]. Suazo kept strangling and so ap-
pellant fired another shot [R-246, 268, 269]. Appellant 
got out of the car and told the others to get out of 
there because he didn't want to hurt them too [R-246, 
271]. One of Suazo's friends then grabbed appellant 
from behind and held in a "full-nelson" [R-177, 247, 
248]. 
4 
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As one began to approach him [R-249] appellant 
shot that person [R-247, 249, 250] and then turned the 
gun to his own side and shot his assailant [R-250]. 
Appellant then flagged down another car [R-76] [R-
251] and went directly to the Tooele City Police De-
partment for help [R-77]. 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I : S E L F - D E F E N S E A N D J U S T I F I -
CATION F O R D E F E N D A N T S CONDUCT 
AS A M A T T E R O F L A W W A S E S T A B -
L I S H E D D U R I N G T H E T R I A L . 
Appellant contends the language of Utah Code 
Annotated 76-2-402, 1953 as amended, entitled "Force 
in defense of person" clearly justifies the actions of 
appellant in regard to the charge of manslaughter and 
the charges of aggravated assault. The statute in the 
Code states: 
"76-2-402. Force in defense of person — (1) a 
person is justified in threatening or using force 
against another when and to the extent that he 
reasonably believes that such force is necessary to 
defend himself or a third person against such 
other's imminent use or unlawful force; how-
ever, a person is justified in using force which is 
intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily 
injury only if he reasonably believes that the 
force is necessary to prevent death or serious 
bodily injury to himself or a third person, or to 
prevent the commission of a forcible felony." 
[emphasis added]. 
5 
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This statute is part of a new Criminal Code en-
acted by the Utah Legislature which became effective 
on July 1, 1973. The former statute on self-defense 
was Utah Code Annotated 76-30-10, entitled: "Justifi-
able homicide by others". The new statute is note-
worthy in that it expands the scope of justifiable homi-
cide to the defense of third persons against another's 
imminent use of unlawful force. The old statute, Utah 
Code Annotated 76-30-10(3) states that homicide was 
justifiable: 
"(3) When committed in the lawful defense of 
such person, or of a wife, husband, parent, child, 
master, mistress or servant of such person, when 
there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design 
to commit a felony or to do some great bodily 
injury and there is imminent danger of such de-
sign being accomplished." 
Under this previous statute, therefore, appellant 
would not have been justified in using the force he 
used if his intention had been to defend his three other 
friends in his car. Significantly, the new statute per-
mits him to defend himself as well as "a third person", 
other than the notion of the newly created justification 
to defend any third person, the new statute, as it ap-
plies to the instant case does not materially differ from 
the old one, but seems to codify the Utah law of self-
defense as it has been interpreted by the courts. One 
is, therefore, justified in applying case law which de-
veloped prior to July, 1973, to actions tried under the 
self-defense statute, Utah Code Annotated 76-2-402, 
1953 as amended. 
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According to the weight of the evidence, or at least 
a fair interpretation, the following is a description of 
events of the evening of August 21, 1973, from the 
standpoint of the appellant, a sixteen year old student 
at Tooele H i g h School [R-234]. Appellant, Rickey 
Lee Jackson, and three of his high school friends de-
cide to go to a drive-in movie. They obtain permis-
sion from their parents [R-196] and proceed north-
ward along Tooele's Main Street [R-196]. They had 
not been drinking [R-112]. Upon leaving the main part 
of town, a car load of Chicanos, whom they did not 
know personally [R-237, 238] but knew of, begin to 
tailgate them [R-243L As the Chicano car passes, A p -
pellant and his friends hear bottles or rocks hit their 
car [R-198, 204, 205, 243, 254, 256]. Immediately upon 
passing, the Chicano car slows [R-258] and then skids 
to a stop [R-199, 206] and its driver, seven years older 
than appellant and forty pounds heavier [R-230, 275] 
jumps out and hurries toward appellant [R-117]. Suazo 
grabs appellant [R-203] around the neck and attempts 
to strangle him [R-244]. Appellant testified and the 
evidence was unmistakable, that Suazo and his friends 
had been drinking [R-116, 125, 130, 131, 161, 252]. 
Terrified by his assailant and remembering stories of 
other attacks of Chicanos on whites in the Tooele area 
[R-240, 276, 277], appellant grabs a .22 pistol from 
the glove compartment [he had been hunting rabbits 
with it the day before [R-266] and shoots Suazo [R-
244]. Suazo continues to squeeze appellant's neck and 
so appellant shoots again [R-246]. Appellant then 
jumps out of the car and tells everyone to leave [R-
7 
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246], that he does not want to hurt them [R-271], but 
is attacked again [R-247, 211] from the rear and there-
after that assailant and another of Suazo's Chicano 
friends are wounded with shots [R-249, 250]. 
Although the prosecution introduced evidence to 
the effect that appellant began shooting at Suazo be-
fore Suazo had even touched Appellant, the blood on 
the outside of the door of Jackson's car shown in a 
photograph marked State's Exhibit #7 renders such 
an interpretation highly improbable. Even the State's 
witness, Jerry Caldwell, who was in the appellant's car, 
testified that he saw someone grabbing appellant [R-
209] and the shooting. The appellant's car was ap-
proached on the passenger side by other occupants of 
Suazo's automobile [R-244, 245]. 
Applying these facts to the Utah Code Annotated 
76-2-402, it is unmistakable that the Appellant acted 
in self-defense — both in defense of himself and in de-
fense of his three friends who were riding with him. 
The statute states that a person is justified in using 
force which is intended or likely to cause death or seri-
ous bodily injury only if he reasonably believes that 
the force is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily 
injury to himself or a third person, or to prevent the 
commission of a forcible felony. 
Jackson testified that he believed he was in danger 
of serious bodily injury [R-253L Upon cross-examin-
ation, appellant further clarified what he meant by 
serious bodily injury [R-277, 278]: 
8 
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"MR. W A T S O N (COUNTY ATTOR-
N E Y ) : What kind of harm did you feel that 
you were going to receive ? 
A. ( J A C K S O N ) : Maybe knocked out, or beat 
up, or have Xs carved on me, or just get beat up. 
Q. Get beat up generally. 
A. Get my car smashed up. 
Q. What fear did you think was going to come 
to the occupants of your car 
A. They'd probably get it as bad as I did." 
Although Utah Code Annotated 76-2-402, 1953 
as amended, says that a person is justified in using 
deadly force if he reasonably believes such force is 
necessary to prevent serious bodily injury or to pre-
vent the commission of a forcible felony, the Code no-
where defines what is meant by the term "forcible 
felony". 
As a practical matter, it seems obvious that the 
legislature probably intended that "forcible felony" be 
interpreted to mean just what its words signify. Thus, 
"forcible felony" would mean any felony in which some 
degree of force was manifest. For example, mayhem is 
an act in which force is used and which can result in a 
felony charge. 
In addition to this logical interpretation, an an-
alysis of the derivation of the current self-defense 
statute renders useful information in helping to define 
what is meant by "forcible felony". Utah Code An-
notated 76-2-402, the statute in question, was derived 
9 
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from the Georgia Criminal Code and appears in the 
Utah Code as an exact duplicate of the Georgia Pro-
vision [See Ga. Code Ann. 26-902]. Significantly, the 
Georgia Code does define "forcible felony", Georgia 
Code Annotated 26-401 (f) states: 
" 'Forcible felony' means any felony which in-
volves the use or threat of physical force or 
violence against any person", [emphasis added] 
Therefore, since Jackson believed [and the State 
presented no evidence whatever to dispel such a belief] 
that he would be beat up, or carved up with a knife, 
it is reasonable to conclude the Appellant was defend-
ing himself and his friends from the commission of a 
forcible felony. A sixteen year old high school boy 
could reasonably conclude that when he is being 
strangled by a twenty-three year old male Chicano 
who weighs forty more pounds than himself, who had 
been drinking and throwing bottles at his car, he is in 
danger of serious bodily injury, or of a "forcible fel-
ony". In weighing the evidence, one is compelled to 
believe appellant's corroborated testimony. Deputy 
Sheriff Jones, of the Tooele County Sheriff's Office 
testified at [R-21] that appellant gave the unsolicited 
remark when he arrived at the Sheriff's Office "He 
had me around the throat, what was I supposed to do?" 
This remark isn't the result of a scheming mind con-
triving some kind of justification, but a spontaneous 
utterance of a boy at a time nearly contemporaneous 
with the event itself. 
10 
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The only element of the defense of justification 
which remains to be fulfilled is the question of whether 
or not appellant reasonably believed that the force he 
used was necessary. Fortunately, the Utah Supreme 
Court has dealt with this issue of reasonableness in the 
context of a claim of self-defense. 
In State v. Terrell, 55 Utah 314, 186 P . 108 
[1919], where defendant was convicted of assault with 
a deadly weapon with intent to do bodily harm, re-
garding the necessity of defense, the court stated: 
". . . the necessity need not be real; it need be 
only reasonably apparent, and the resistance 
offered in good faith, upon reasonable grounds 
of belief that the invasion of some right accorded 
by the statute is being made by the offender . . . " 
Id. at 111. 
In the case of the appellant, then, one does not 
judge by hindsight whether in the given circumstances 
the amount of force used in defense of oneself was rea-
sonable or not — the necessity to defend oneself need 
be only reasonably apparent and offered in good faith. 
In State v. Turner, 95 Utah 129, 79 P.2d 46 
[1938], defendant was convicted of voluntary man-
slaughter. The Utah Supreme Court discussed at 
length and with enlightenment the justification of 
self-defense. That Court stated: 
"There must generally be some act or demonstra-
tion on the part of the deceased which induced a 
reasonable belief on the part of the defendant 
that he was about to lose his life or suffer some 
11 
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great bodily harm." [or be the victim of a forc-
ible felony under the present statute] Id. at 51 
Again, the weight of the evidence reveals that ap-
pellant, Rickey Lee Jackson, was being strangled. As 
to whether such an act would justify a reasonable be-
lief on the par t of the defendant, the Turner court con-
tinued : 
" H e (defendant) might have awaited until he 
received great bodily harm, but if one who is 
attacked must restrain himself until subsequent 
events determine whether the attack will result 
fatally or in grievous bodily harm, then the right 
of self-defense is one in name only. This is not 
the law. A person assailed may act upon appear-
ances as they present themselves to him, meet 
force with force, and even slay his assailant; and, 
though in fact he was not in any actual peril, 
yet if the circumstances were such that a reason-
able man would be justified in acting as he did, 
the slayer will be held blameless." Id. 58, 59 
The court further stated: 
". . . . a person will not be held responsible 
civilly or criminally if he acts in self-defense, 
from real or honest convictions induced by rea-
sonable evidence, although he may be mistaken 
as to the existence of actual danger." Id. 59 
Clearly, appellant, Jackson, was not the aggressor 
in the instant case. There was no evidence whatsoever 
presented at trial that appellant or any of his friends 
approached the Suazo car before Suazo and his friends 
jumped out and headed for appellant and his friends. 
Under all evidence before any shot was fired, whether 
12 
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or not appellant was in fact in danger of death or seri-
ous bodily injuries, he was entitled to decide based upon 
appearances as they presented themselves at the 
moment. H e did: that he and his friends were in 
danger. Finally, a forcible felony, i.e., attempted 
strangulation of appellant, did actually take place. 
Under terms of Utah Code Annotated 76-2-402 
then, appellant was unquestionably justified in using 
force which was likely to cause death or serious bodily 
injury to protect himself. When he was out of the car 
and was again attacked from the rear, he again was 
entitled to defend himself. 
As recently as 1944, the Utah Supreme Court has 
reiterated its reasoning in Turner. I n State v. Law, 
106 Utah 196, 147 P.2d 324 [1944], where a defendant 
was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter, the court 
summarized the basic elements of self-defense. I n an 
opinion which concurred with the majority, Justify 
Larson reasoned: 
". . . The element of self-defense, or justifiable 
homicide is predicated upon two propositions: 
(a) That the circumstances and surroundings 
were such that a man might reasonably believe 
he was in imminent peril of death or great bodily 
injury, (b) That the actor did actually believe 
he was in such danger." Id. 329 
I t is the contention of the appellant that the evidence 
in the case at hand is so conclusive that every reason-
able mind must say the force employed was necessary 
to defend against aggression. Therefore, as a matter 
13 
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of law, the appellant was justified in his actions in de-
fending himself and his friends from the forcible fel-
onies. The question of whether appellant could rea-
sonably have concluded that a forcible felony wras about 
to be committed is a factual question which, in the in-
stant case, was left to the judge to decide. Neverthe-
less, on the basis of the evidence presented, both by 
the state and the defense, appellant contends the trial 
court erred as a matter of law and in its interpretation 
of the facts. 
As regards the two counts of aggravated assault, 
the judge in the juvenile court hearing concluded at a 
certain point in the altercation, appellant became the 
aggressor, and therefore, U tah Code Annotated 76-2-
402(2) (c) became controlling. This statute reads as 
follows: 
" ( 2 ) A person is not justified in using force 
under the circumstances specified in paragraph 
(1) of this section if he: 
(c) W a s the aggressor or was engaged in 
a combat by agreement, unless he with-
draws from the encounter and effectively 
communicates to such other person his in-
tent to do so and the other notwithstanding, 
continues or threatens to continue the use of 
unlawful force." 
There is conflicting evidence as to what occurred 
after Suazo was shot. The evidence indicates that ap-
pellant got out of his car and told the other Chicanos 
to get out of there because he did not want to hurt 
14 
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them, whereupon he was again attacked from the rear 
and put in a "full-Nelson" [R-185, 186]. Even Paul 
Mondragen, a State's witness and one of those shot, 
testified that as Jackson got out of the car, he heard 
appellant say, "Get out of here, get out of here." [R-
176, 182, 183]. This testimony was corroborated by 
another State's witness, Jerry Caldwell, who said he 
heard appellant say "Get out of here" or "go on" or 
"something like that" [R-210, 271]. I t is also uncon-
tradicted evidence that appellant did not fire any shots 
after the two at Suazo, until he was attacked again. 
The conclusion of the trial judge in juvenile Court 
that appellant was the aggressor is so offensive to any 
fair interpretation of the facts that one is compelled 
to wonder why complaints were not brought against the 
riders in the Suazo automobile, instead of appellant. 
Applying the foregoing evidence to Utah Code 
Annotated 76-2-402 (2) (c), it is incredible to conclude 
that appellant ever became the aggressor. The statute 
states that even if one was the aggressor, which appel-
lant obviously was not, he may still justify defending 
himself if he effectively communicates to such other 
person his intent to do so. The testimony cited im-
mediately above indicates without doubt the communi-
cated desire to leave his assailants alone, but he was at-
tacked again anyway. The members of the Suazo 
party were the aggressors, as was Suazo himself — not 
appellant nor his friends. 
In State v. Turner, supra, the court dealt with the 
effect of one abandoning his intention to inflict injury: 
15 
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". . . Where, however, a person has in good faith 
abandoned his intention to inflict injury on an-
other and is retreating, he is entitled to defend if 
pursued and attacked." Id. 60 
Here , appellant abandoned any intention to inflict 
injury further, but was attacked again. H e was, there-
fore, entitled to defend himself by virtue of Utah Code 
Annotated 76-2-402 (2) (c) , and the reasoning of the 
Utah Supreme Court as enunciated in Turner. 
I n the instant case, the trial court failed to com-
prehend the clear meaning of the Utah statutes dealing 
with justification or self-defense. 
P O I N T I I : R E A S O N A B L E D O U B T W A S 
E S T A B L I S H E D A S A M A T T E R O F F A C T . 
Utah Code Annotated 77-31-4, 1953 as amended, 
states: 
" A defendant in a criminal action is presumed 
to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and 
in case of a reasonable doubt whether his guilt is 
satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to an acquit-
tal ." 
Appellant respectfully contends that the case pre-
sented by the State did not prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt the guilt of the appellant. I n a case where there 
is evidence regarding the possibility of self-defense, the 
appellant is not required to establish his defense be-
yond a reasonable doubt. I n State v. Coyle, 41 Utah 
320,126 P . 305, the Court1 stated: 
16 
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"Under this section, (regarding self-defense) it 
is error to instruct the j u r y that the defendant 
is required to establish his defense beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. If his defense creates a reason-
able doubt in the mind of the j u ry of his guilt, 
he is entitled to an acquittal." 
I n the later case of State v. Talarico, 57 Utah 229, 
193 P . 860, the court reiterated its holding in Coyle: 
" I n a prosecution for assault with a deadly 
weapon, with intent to commit bodily harm, de-
fendant was not required to establish his claim 
of self-defense by preponderance of the evidence, 
but was entitled to acquittal if on the whole evid-
ence the j u r y entertained a reasonable doubt as 
to whether or not he acted in self-defense." 
The evidence presented in the instant case with-
out question raises a reasonable doubt as to whether or 
not appellant acted in self-defense. I n the trial court, 
the judge declared without explanation and in a con-
elusory fashion, that "the court has rejected the idea 
or the defense of self-defense" [R-310]. The judge 
added tha t : "The Court is not convinced from the evid-
ence that has been produced that Rickey Jackson rea-
sonably believed that the shooting was necessary to 
prevent death or serious bodily injury to him or the 
others in his car" [R-310]. These two phrases by the 
court are the only ones in the entire record which deal 
with the issue of self-defense. I t would appear the 
judge thought the defendant had to prove his innocence 
through his affirmative defense, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, instead of the other way around. Fur ther , the 
court completely neglects the mention of the notion of 
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6
'forcible felony", relying solely on appellant's fear of 
"death or serious bodily in jury" to himself or his 
friends. Tha t the facts show clearly that appellant had 
a reasonable fear of Suazo committing a "forcible 
felony" has been covered in Point I . 
I n State v. Harris, 58 Utah 331, 199 P.145, the 
Court spoke again of the nature of the burden of proof 
in establishing self-defense: 
"When the defendant offers proof of self-de-
fense, he is entitled to acquittal if he has pro-
duced sufficient evidence of his justification to 
create in the minds of the j u ry a reasonable 
doubt of his guilt of the offense charged." 
Appellant contends that as a matter of fact such rea-
sonable doubt was raised, as to create in the mind of 
any reasonable ju ry , doubt of defendant's guilt of the 
offense charged. Even if the trial judge had in his 
mind that the defendant was required to sustain the 
burden by "preponderance of the evidence", State v. 
Talarico, supra, dispels such a notion. 
I n view of the possible uprising of the Tooele 
Chicano community, had appellant not been convicted 
of something, perhaps the way in which the traditional 
burden of "beyond a reasonable doubt" was somehow 
ignored in the instant case is explicable. Rationalizing 
a decision for the sake of political expediency, however, 
is not the course of the law. The evidence presented in 
this case was not complicated or terribly contradictory; 
further, the evidence that was in any way contradictory 
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was almost consistently voluminous in favor of the ap-
pellant. 
For example, those who were riding with Suazo, 
testified that although they had been drinking, they 
had not thrown any empty bottles or cans of beer. [It-
I l l , 179]. Yet a witness who lived in a trailer court on 
Highway 36, Walter Miner, testified that as two cars 
passed the trailer court, a few minutes before the shoot-
ings, a bottle struck the driveway going into the trailer 
court and broke upon impact [R-101]. The evidence 
further indicated that although the Suazo vehicle pass-
engers had purchased two six packs of bottled beer, 
there were a number of bottles missing when the cars 
were searched after the shootings — meaning that these 
bottles were either thrown out of the car, or emptied 
in a trash can some where along the way. 
Since the judge in a criminal case which is tried in 
juvenile court acts as both the judge and jury, the 
possibilities for gross unfairness are multiplied. The 
comments of the judge in his decision in the juvenile 
court hearing indicate confusion as to the burden ap-
pellant had to comply with in order to establish his 
affirmative defense [R-310]. 
Appellant submits that a thorough reading of the 
record leaves no basis for a conclusion that the appel-
lant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
P O I N T I I I : T H E L A N G U A G E I N SECTION 
76-5-103, U T A H CODE A N N O T A T E D , 1953 AS 
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A M E N D E D , IS A M B I G U O U S A N D AS SUCH 
D O E S NOT D E F I N E T H E COMMISSION O F 
A P U B L I C O F F E N S E . TO C H A R G E T H E 
D E F E N D A N T W I T H T H E COMMISSION OF 
AN O F F E N S E W H I C H IS NOT D E F I N E D IS 
C L E A R L Y V I O L A T I V E O F E S T A B L I S H E D 
L A W . 
In a case presently before the Utah Supreme 
Court, State of Utah vs. Vincent Joseph Archulettay 
Case No. 13579 this issue has been raised. Appellant 
in the instant case submits that the holding of the Utah 
Supreme Court in the Archuletta case will be dis-
positive of this issue for the case at hand as well. If 
the District Court is upheld in its ruling, there was no 
aggravated assault statute in Utah during the alleged 
commission of the aggravated assaults of the appellant, 
Rickey Lee Jackson, and therefore, the verdict as to 
the two counts of aggravated assault must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the appellant's clear 
establishment of sufficient evidence of justification and 
self-defense to create a reasonable doubt of appellant's 
guilt, the failure of the State to sustain the burden of 
proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the 
appellant, appellant requests the decision of the Juv-
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enile Court be overturned and that the appellant be 
found not guilty of any of the offenses charged. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT M. McRAE 
HATCH, McRAE & RICHARDSON 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
370 East Fifth South Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 364-6474 
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